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It is an immense privilege to respond, as discussant, to James
Gathii’s 2020 Grotius Lecture.1 I have known and admired Professor
Gathii and his work for decades. He is one of those people who
manages to combine great accomplishment in international legal
scholarship and practice with an unswerving commitment to teaching,
collegiality, and mentoring. In these, and in other ways, James Gathii
walks his talk. And his talk, as you have heard, is challenging.
Gathii’s lecture issues two challenges to this year’s meeting of the
American Society of International Law and to the discipline and
profession that it represents. The first is a challenge to the discipline’s
“limited geography of places and ideas.”2 Gathii asks us to scrutinize
carefully the places to which we look when registering significant
theoretical and doctrinal developments in international law. In
*

Professor, and Australian Research Council Future Fellow, Faculty of Law &
Justice, UNSW Sydney.
1. James Thuo Gathii, Twenty-Second Annual Grotius Lecture: The Promise of
International Law: A Third World View (Including a TWAIL Bibliography 19962019 as an Appendix), 36 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 377 (2021); see also 114 AM. SOC’Y
INT’L L. PROC. 165 (2020).
2. Id. at 378.
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particular, he asks us to note the discipline’s endemic under-attention
to institutions and experts located in Africa and to legal innovations
for which they are responsible. The second is a challenge to take
account of that distinctive point of embarkation for work in
international law that is the “subaltern epistemic location” assumed by
Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL).3 I am going
to address each of these challenges, to try to amplify them a little, and
to consider what they might mean for scholars writing and practicing
from other epistemic locations. To do so, I want first to connect these
two challenges to the theme of the annual meeting of the American
Society of International Law: the promise of international law.

I. THE PROMISES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
At least two notions of the word “promise” surface in Gathii’s
lecture, where they work in some tension with one another. The first
is a notion of promise as a declaration or assurance made to another
person or, in an older meaning, a feeling of assurance.4 This is the
promise of contractualism. The second is an idea of promise connected
to futurity. That is, promise as an indication of a future event or
condition. This is the promise of counterfactualism.
As to the first, Gathii works to dislodge that sense of assurance that
international law often seems to offer. Perhaps, he suggests, we should
not feel so confident in the amplitude and beneficence of our
discipline’s promises. More specifically, Gathii challenges that
disciplinary assurance that enables “international law produced in
places like Arusha” to be hidden “in plain sight”.5 International law,
as a discipline, claims to invite engagement from all places and all
peoples. Anyone willing to sign up, so to speak, is supposed to be
welcome. Yet somehow, African jurists always seem to be on the
outside of its promissory dealings.
As Gathii makes very clear, his point in asking among whom the
promises of international law are made is not to argue for broader
recognition. His argument is, rather, for resistance—that is, resistance
to “knowledge production systems that silence [African jurists] and
3. Id. at 379.
4. Promise, OXFORD ENG. DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2007).
5. Gathii, supra note 1, at 380.
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their engagements with international law.”6 To put it possibly too
crudely, this is an argument for anti-racism, not for racial tolerance.7
Gathii’s call is for action, not for permission.
Alongside this call, Gathii’s lecture also evokes a second idea of the
promise of international law. He does so by refiguring the futurity with
which international law is commonly invested. In his account,
international law’s future promise is most apparent in the willingness
of TWAIL scholars to both “struggle against the international law they
were taught” and yet remain “enamored” of it to still see it as
amenable to being “rescued.”8 The promise of international law so
rendered is not a near-neighbor of its present. The future condition of
international law evoked in the “rebel imagination” of TWAIL is
almost surreal in its insistence upon multiple possibilities latent in the
now.9 And yet its engagements are also resolutely practical, as Gathii
highlights when he speaks of the many ways in which TWAIL
scholars are active in the practice of international law.
It is important to note that this second sense of promise is not a
negation of the first. TWAIL scholars’ continued willingness to work
on international law’s future does not correct or make up for the
blindness of the discipline stemming from its misplaced assurance.
Rather, this futurist sense of promise proceeds directly from the
discipline’s confident myopia. It is precisely because the creative work
of international lawyers working in Arusha has been “marginalized
doctrinally and theoretically” that TWAIL scholars taking Arusha and
other Third World locales as an epistemic starting point can offer
6. Id. at 388.
7. See Alana Lentin, What Happens to Anti-Racism When We Are Post-Race?,
19 FEMINIST LEGAL STUD. 159, 159 60 (2011) (arguing that the problematisation
of race put forward by anti-racist activists and scholars has been hampered by a postracial agenda that participates in relativizing the experience of racism, consequently
assisting in perpetuating it ); Yin Paradies, Whither Anti-Racism?, 39 ETHNIC &
RACIAL STUD. 1, 4 (2016) (introducing the three key critiques of tolerance as antiracism: (1) [racial tolerance] is morally inadequate in that racism should be
overcome rather than abided, (2) it perpetuates or, at least, fails to remedy the
asymmetrical power relations inherent in racialized systems of
disadvantage/oppression, and (3) it cannot be achieved in the context of superdiversity’ ).
8. Gathii, supra note 1, at 408.
9. Id. at 408.
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something other than an affirmation of the pre-existing order:
something that smacks of the future.10
What, then, is this other future that international law might yet
promise? And how might we get there, if we seek to do so? To think
through these questions, let us return, now, to the two senses of
location and prospects for relocation that James Gathii offers in his
talk. The first is geographic and the second, epistemic.

II. THE LOCATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
The promise of international law that Gathii calls forth is
geographic not historic. That is to say, the alternative future of which
he speaks is spatial rather than sequential in its relationship to the
present. The work required to arrive at this other place is redistributive,
rather than developmental. This futurity is not a matter of
advancement. It is not a condition toward which we may expect,
almost inevitably, to progress.11 Instead, the anti-compartmental,
intersectional approach to international law of which Gathii speaks
this is already here, already in practice. We can, so to speak, go there.
Likewise, the promise of listening to and learning from jurists
working in Arusha is not the promise of cosmopolitan erudition. This
is not the Grotius Lecture as travelogue. Rather, its promise depends
on displacement and replacement. It seems to me that by proposing
that international lawyers learn more from legal work ongoing in
Arusha, Gathii is not asking for a dash of African jurisprudence to be
included in the existing international legal canon in some tasteenhancing way. I hear him saying, in effect, international lawyers:
move aside, decamp. There is another canon from which we may
learn. There is another ground from which to begin. But, in order to
do so, we must give up some of the things we know, practice, and
teach. We must cut some ties, break some bonds, and relinquish some
powers that we relish. We must rehinge the discipline on another pivot
of places and ideas and then do so again and again. That is, we who
10. Id. at 383.
11. THOMAS SKOUTERIS, THE NOTION OF PROGRESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
DISCOURSE VII (2009) (observing that the idea of progress as a natural and
ineluctable force is ubiquitous within the discipline of international law a narrative
which Gathii’s lecture rejected).
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live and learn in places like Washington DC, Geneva, New York,
Paris, London, and The Hague or, in my case, the somewhat less
central location of Sydney must try to take other places and
traditions as keystones for our work, or defer to those who do. In my
case, I hear this as a call to center First Nations jurists and envoys as
founding thinkers of the international in settler colonies like the one I
inhabit.12
That other pivot is the distinct epistemic location of which TWAIL
is a marker in Gathii’s lecture. Again, TWAIL is not, by Gathii’s
description, just one perspective among many. It is not an ornamental
enhancement to international law’s décor. It is an entire world at
once, both material and ideal. TWAIL has an account of sources and
sovereignty, self-defense and self-determination, the law of the sea
and the laws of war. It offers far more than tweaks and add-ons.
TWAIL is at least as general a world view as that of so-called
“general” international law routinely set out in textbooks. And like all
world views, it has blind spots and biases embedded within it. TWAIL
cannot claim to be outside of power. On the contrary, TWAIL
scholarship is often highly self-critical. At its most cogent, it is as
intolerant of its own complicities and chauvinisms as it is intolerant of
so much of international law’s tepid ambivalence toward power and
privilege.

12. See RAVI DE COSTA, A HIGHER AUTHORITY: INDIGENOUS
TRANSNATIONALISM AND AUSTRALIA (2006) (observing that First Nations peoples
in Australia were engaged in transnational relations long before colonial
displacement, but were compelled to reinvent their transnationalism from the 1970s
onwards as part of a global movement oriented around international institutions);
Mark McMillan, Koowarta and the Rival Indigenous International: Our Place as
Indigenous Peoples in the International, 23 GRIFFITH L. REV. 110, 117 18 (2014)
(characterizing the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples
in 2007 as a meeting point of law for indigenous people outside of the AngloAustralian legal system); Mark McMillan & Sophie Rigney, The Place of the First
Peoples in the International Sphere: A Logical Starting Point for the Demand for
Justice by Indigenous Peoples, 39 MELB. U.L. REV. 981, 992 (2016) (arguing that
indigeneity was developed as a means of stabilizing the international order and
justifying colonial expansion, but that this and other fundaments of the modern
international remain open to First Nations’ reinvention).
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THE POLITICS OF PRIVILEGE

If TWAIL scholarship makes knowledge otherwise that is, in a
register of relentless anti-subordination then what does that
scholarship demand of international lawyers proceeding from other
epistemic locations and in other registers?
One answer could be nothing at all. TWAIL scholarship does not
come begging at the door of non-TWAIL scholars. TWAIL
scholarship does not need to integrate or collaborate. There is quite
enough energy and heterogeneity within the “movement-of-sorts” that
is TWAIL in order to sustain and grow it. Gathii’s lecture, and the
accompanying bibliography, make this very apparent.13
Gathii’s lecture is, however, more generous and open-doored than
that. It is addressed, in part, to those “interested in engaging with and
learning from this scholarship” and keen to “diversify their syllabus
and curriculum.”14 This suggests a second possible answer: listen,
learn, and move out of the way.15 Delete core texts from the syllabus.
Try inserting African jurists, Indigenous jurists and others working
from subaltern locales at the heart of the international law canon,
whether in teaching or in practice. Also, Gathii seems to be suggesting,
do not presume to know what TWAIL scholars are on about or assume
that they all agree read the work. James Gathii’s lecture has provided
us all with many authors and texts to follow up on.16 In part, this lecture
has been an invitation to a kind of virtual study group.
Yet, as the Indian literary theorist Gayatri Spivak has cautioned, to
13. See generally Gathii, supra note 1.
14. Id. at 414.
15. Listening, in this context, has relatively little to do with the kind of exchange
of arguments and counter-arguments routinely enacted in legal practice and
scholarship. It recalls, rather, the insurgent, uneasy listening of James Baldwin.
See ED PAVLI , WHO CAN AFFORD TO IMPROVISE? JAMES BALDWIN AND BLACK
MUSIC, THE LYRIC AND THE LISTENERS 164, 166, 292 93 (2016) (suggesting that
insurgent listening of a kind encouraged by the lyric tradition of black music,
enables people to touch the turbulence of life and prompts us to listen more closely
to what’s going on within, between, and around us ); Shana L. Redmond, Of Treads
and Thunder: The Insurgent Listening of Lorraine Hansberry and James Baldwin,
49 BLACK SCHOLAR: J. BLACK STUD. & RESEARCH 51, 52 53 (2019) (arguing that
insurgent listening is the strategic, interdisciplinary, and multimethod curation of
the world as sound or an attempt at reordering).
16. See generally Gathii, supra note 1.
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listen for the subaltern voice entails more than fixating on concrete
experiences of the oppressed.17 The subaltern epistemic location that
Gathii invokes is irredeemably heterogenous. It is not one place, one
viewpoint, one voice. It is not a place of powerlessness. It is also not
a place of distinctive black genius—the figment of apologetic fantasy
of which the Cameroonian philosopher Achille Mbembe is so
scathing.18
No, the epistemic location that Gathii wants to allow those of us
embarking from other locations to encounter may, in his rendering, be
inviting and hospitable. But it is neither abject nor celestial. It is
fraught.
Those of us reading and writing from other epistemic beginnings
must engage, I think, with humility. We will make mistakes. Goodness
knows, I have. Our good intentions will not insulate us from
responsibility. The history of racism is replete with good intentions
and good manners. Taking up the challenge of anti-racism, with
TWAIL scholars as main-stage interlocutors—this requires far more
than benevolence, far more than incremental reform. It demands
redistribution and handover. It requires breaking things, but doing so
with care and insight, not in the Silicon Valley mode. Read and listen,
but also—reallocate resources and devolve power. This is something
of what I hear James Gathii saying to me and to other international
lawyers. This is the promise that I hear him offering. International
law’s future may be already here—just not in the places and ways in
which we tend to look for it.
I am grateful to James Gathii for relocating and recalling the
promise of international law. These are troubled and troubling times,
but they are also times at which fundamental, structural change seems
17. See Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Can the Subaltern Speak?, in MARXISM
INTERPRETATION OF CULTURE 271, 275 (Cary Nelson & Lawrence
Grossberg eds., 1998) (recognizing the role that intellectuals’ experience plays in
disclosing the experiences of the oppressed); Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Scattered
Speculations on the Subaltern and the Popular, 8 POSTCOLONIAL STUD. 475, 475
(2005) (“Subalternity cannot be generalized according to hegemonic logic.”).
18. ACHILLE MBEMBE, ON THE POSTCOLONY 12 (2001) (“To secure
emancipation and recognition, [many African thinkers] thought, required the
production of an apologestic discourse based on rediscovery of what was supposed
to be the essence, the distinctive genius, of the black ‘race.’”).
AND THE
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within reach and indeed already underway—change that would be
well informed by the TWAIL commitment to anti-subordination. That
is, if we are collectively up to the task of realizing this moment’s
promise.

